



**STRATEGY  
RESEARCH  
PROJECT**

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**INTEGRATION OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD  
INTO THE TOTAL ARMY**

**BY**

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL STEPHEN A. STOHLA  
AND  
LIEUTENANT COLONEL MICHAEL G. TEMME  
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS  
SSC Fellows  
United States Army**

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Into the Total Army

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LTC Stephen A. Stohla  
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LTC Michael G. Temme

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Dr. Walter LaBerge  
and  
LTG(Ret.) Howard D. Graves  
Project Advisors

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U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013



## ABSTRACT

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The Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) have been battling its roles, missions, and force structure for many years. Recently, however, the "rift" has escalated. Much of this "rift" has come on the heels of the Reagan Administration military buildup and from the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) panel findings. In a time where fighting for dollars and resources has become increasingly important, it has become evident that survival of each component is being desperately fought for on Capitol Hill as well as in the halls of the Pentagon.

Today, one cannot exist without the other, but they can, in fact, do a better job of coexisting as a Total Force. This paper does not discuss specific force structure, but does assume the Department of Defense (DOD) will continue to downsize the number of soldiers each component will have in its force structure. Instead of battling prose around the Beltway we offer recommendations on how we can benefit from each other instead of consuming each other.

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## INTRODUCTION

The seamless integration of the Active Component (AC) and Reserve Components (RC) is the most important issue confronting the Army today. We must integrate the resources and capabilities of the Total Army to meet future requirements.

To understand the modern day American reservist, one must first understand the American tradition of "citizen soldier." During the eighteenth century, military campaigns began in the spring and continued only until the winter prevented further operations. It is unlikely that our leaders at that time would have been interested in paying for a full-time army on a year-round basis. With the exception of the Civil War and World Wars, the standing army of the United States has been relatively small until the advent of the Cold War.

Going back in recent history to the Vietnam conflict, many people were aware of President Lyndon Johnson's rejection of Army Chief of Staff Harold Johnson's recommendation to call up the Reserves. Political advisors surrounding Johnson believed that mobilization of the Reserves was inviting a declaration of war. Fortunately, today's society's attitude makes the mobilization of the Reserves paramount to gather public opinion and support in a time of crisis. Would it have been worse to mobilize the Reserves during the Vietnam era? It is doubtful. During the 1970's, military planners gradually started

increasing the opportunities and responsibilities to the National Guard and Reserves, keeping in line with the "Total Force Policy" of the Department of Defense.

During the military force buildup of the 1980s under President Ronald Reagan, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger wasted little time in stating that the Reserve Components were to be "full partners with their Active Component counterparts in the Reagan administration." When Weinberger addressed the Congress the following year, he stated that:

We can no longer consider reserve forces as merely forces in reserve. Instead, they have to be an integral part of the total force, both within the United States and with NATO. They have to be, and in fact are, a blending of the professionalism of the full-time soldier with the professionalism of the citizen-soldier. Only in that way can we achieve the military strength that is necessary to defend our freedom.<sup>1</sup>

Keeping with his rhetoric, Weinberger followed up with a memorandum policy to the military services. He established the policy of "first to fight, first to equip" and concluded that early deploying Guard and Reserve units must have the modern equipment inventories to perform their missions. Henceforth, "units that fight first would be equipped first, regardless of component."<sup>2</sup> To keep consistent with the Department of Defense's policy of "first to fight," it is imperative that the modernization of these early deploying Active Component and Reserve Component units are compatible and interoperable.

Therefore, in the move to digitize the Army, the Reserve Component elements of the Contingency Force Support Packages must be modernized simultaneously with the Active Component.

At the onset of Desert Shield and Desert Storm, it became increasingly apparent that there was no way that a multinational force would be successful without mobilizing the Reserves. In fact, approximately seventy percent of the army's combat service support to include transportation, ammunition, water purifying and medical units and other parts of the logistical base, resided in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve.<sup>3</sup> Suffice it to say, the Gulf War was successful because of the integration of the Reserves with the active force across all services, branches, and units.

When Stephen M. Duncan was the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs under President Ronald Reagan and President George Bush, he testified before Congress about the Total Force Debate. He hoped to dispel some of the more extreme arguments being made for and against the idea of greater reliance upon the Reserve Components. He noted that the Total Force Policy was:

never intended to make Active Component career soldiers and reserve soldiers fungible items or mirror images of each other, and that it was unrealistic to try to make every reserve unit the absolute equal in terms of readiness and capability of the best active units. Rather, I asserted, the objective is to integrate the capabilities and strengths of active and

reserve units in the most cost effective manner, i.e., one that provides the most military capability and flexibility possible within the limitations of the budget. I tried to lay to rest any illusion that the Total Force Policy required across-the-board cuts in the active forces or increased reliance on all reserve units. A balanced analysis, I argued, must start with a focus on *particular missions*. Some missions, which require a high surge of activity in wartime or in other times of crisis but comparatively low activity in peacetime, are obviously ideal for reservists. Others, such as those that require long periods of deployment in peacetime, are unsuitable. Yet others might be reasonably assigned to either active or reserve units.<sup>4</sup>

#### THE GUARD IN THE 1990'S

During the 1990's, American political leaders were warring over the future mix of active and reserve armed forces. Before President Bush's defense budget was submitted before Congress, Congressman Jack Murtha, chairman of the House Appropriation Committee's Defense Subcommittee, sent a warning to Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. Murtha reminded Cheney that the 1991 Defense Appropriations Act forbade the expenditure of any funds to reduce reserve personnel strength. Though not everyone agreed with Murtha, he believed that during a time of decreasing defense budgets, it made more sense to put more, not less, force structure into the Reserve Components.<sup>5</sup> After much confusion over comments made by Secretary Cheney about reducing the role

of Reserves in combat, Marine Corps General Al Gray gave a speech regarding the essence of the administration's proposal stating:

The way we're structured in the military today is that we've got Guard and Reserve units that provide the combat support and service support for the active duty combat units...If we're going to cut a third of the active army, then I don't need as many Reserve units to provide the combat support for those active units. . . We've got Guard and Reserve units that no longer have a mission. But I'm told by Congress,... that I can't get rid of one single guardsman or reservist... If I cannot cut the National Guard and Reserve, the army alone is going to be short \$11 billion over the next five years.<sup>6</sup>

General Ed Burba, Army Forces Command, echoed General Gray's view. General Burba followed up with a letter to Cheney that did not mince words. He said:

We now know more about the proper AC/RC mix than ever before. Despite our energetic efforts to educate the Congress, I fear we are on an azimuth which protects excess Reserve Component force structure at the cost of diverting funds from the Active Component and Reserve Component training, maintenance, personnel and infrastructure resources we need to maintain the readiness standards required by our contemporary contingency environment.<sup>7</sup>

The debate is not limited to general officers or political appointees. Though they may like to avoid the debate, even presidential candidates are not immune from being part of the controversy. In September 1992, President George Bush addressed the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) at its annual convention in Salt Lake City, Utah. Although he

reaffirmed his commitment to the Total Force concept and declared that the maintenance of strong, capable reserve forces would remain essential to our military strategy, he added some reality,

We recognize the need to be sensitive to the demands placed on individual national guardsmen, reservists, and really . . . their families. As true citizen soldiers, our guardsmen must devote time to their families, civilian occupations, or education. If we intrude upon you for every trouble, we may find it hard to keep the very best soldiers that characterize the Guard today. The new National Guard will be smaller - just as our active forces are being reduced. Anyone who tells you different is simply not leveling with you.<sup>8</sup>

As is common during election years, presidential candidate Governor Bill Clinton followed President Bush in addressing the National Guard convention. Without giving any notion of his National Strategy, Governor Clinton promised "a stronger role for the Guard and the Reserve than is called for in the present Bush force plan." He promised that the reductions would retain the "traditional combat orientation" and "historic combat role" of the National Guard. Within four years of that promise, he converted eleven Guard combat brigades and one scout unit from combat missions to support roles.<sup>9</sup>

Seldom have we, as Americans, agreed on a coherent definition of our national security requirements. We also struggle to define our national interests, especially those for which we are willing to fight. In 1984, Secretary of Defense

Caspar Weinberger addressed the National Press Club and outlined six criteria tests for the use of military forces abroad:

1. Do the circumstances involve vital American interests?
2. Is there a clear intention of winning (measured in part by a willingness to use whatever military force is necessary to succeed)?
3. Are the political and military objectives clearly defined?
4. Is there a continuing reassessment and reevaluation of the need for military force after it has been applied (i.e., in case the military objectives change)?
5. Do the American people and Congress support the effort?
6. Is military force being used only as a last resort?<sup>10</sup>

#### GUARD SUPPORT

While the National Guard and Reserves are being called upon to perform peacetime operations that previously went to the active units, they are also assuming responsibilities for domestic social programs and other missions that have little to do with serious national security problems. It is clear why the civilian and military leaders reach out and touch the Reserves. Most of the capabilities and skills that are required to perform peacekeeping humanitarian assistance, and similar operations that require strategic and tactical airlift, civil affairs, engineering, military police, medical and transportation, reside in the Reserve Forces.

Most guardsmen did not join the National Guard to directly support domestic social programs. The mayor of Washington, D.C., for example, urged the President to authorize the use of guardsmen for routine police work such as transporting prisoners, answering 911 phone calls, and directing traffic during roadblocks.<sup>11</sup> In 1993, over \$58 million was spent by the Defense Department in twenty-four states so that guardsmen could provide medical care in inner cities and rural areas and establish educational programs to train high school dropouts and improve science and math education in inner-city schools. Simultaneously, a defense official announced plans to use reservists to build recreation centers in hopes of keeping high school drop outs from entering the welfare system.<sup>12</sup> While some may see this support as a viable national security challenge, others would argue that it is a cheap and handy solution.

When use of the Reserves is continuing down this path of frequent call-ups for missions that are not of a true national emergency, we are severely impacting the individual soldier in his personal life and professional work. Employers are no longer willing to let guardsmen leave their place of business to perform missions short of a natural disaster, or national crisis. The resentment between the guardsman, his employer, and his family continues to grow and we may soon reach a breaking point.

Stephen Duncan echoes these thoughts. He says the:

Dangers are real. If the United States continues to operate in a strategy vacuum, if the armed forces are diverted from the fundamental mission of war fighting, if we continue to presume upon the patriotism and limited time of our part-time citizen warriors by using them as a cheap labor pool for public needs that do not involve serious threats to the nation's security, a day of reckoning will slowly but surely arrive. At some point, the high-quality reservists whose skills and experience make them the seedcorn for future combat leadership will reluctantly but inevitably conclude that they simply don't have enough time to remain in the armed forces and to adequately fulfill commitments to their civilian careers, to their families and to educational and other private needs. Reservists who serve for the opportunity to engage in old-fashioned soldiering and to develop warrior skills of immediate use when the nation's safety is threatened will leave as much of the adventure, patriotic, and other features of reserve service that make the sacrifices worthwhile begin to disappear. The quality of the Reserve Components will deteriorate. Our ability to protect national interests that are unequivocally "vital" will become seriously affected.<sup>13</sup>

But what is the appropriate mix or balance of active and reserve forces? Stephen Duncan believes that the entire focus of Total Force planning should be based on the capability of the unit to perform that particular mission. He calls this the "mission-to-capability" framework that requires planners to link strategy with specific operations and tasks.<sup>14</sup> This is not a difficult concept to understand; yet we sometimes find ourselves struggling with this very issue.

## THE GUARD OF THE FUTURE

Duncan believes that the use of the Guard and the Reserves in the future should be predicated on thirty-five principles. I will not elaborate on each principle here, but simply list a few of them in no particular order:

- New ways to integrate active and reserve units must be found.
- The active peacetime force should be as small as the military strategy permits.
- A rebuttable presumption should be established that missions are to be assigned to reserve units.
- Factors other than capability and cost are relevant to force mix decisions.
- Some early deploying missions can be assigned to reservists.
- Reservists train as units and should normally be deployed as units.
- Reserve combat units should be kept small and should train with active units as much as possible.
- Reserve units must be given the tools to perform assigned missions.
- Reserve units should not normally be used in peacetime operations that do not relate directly to the performance of their wartime missions.
- There are limits to the sacrifices that the families and employers of reservists are willing to make.
- Excessive activations of reservists for relatively unimportant contingencies will threaten public support for serious crises.
- Force mix decisions should be made only by public officials who are accountable.<sup>15</sup>

In his September 4, 1997 memorandum to the: Secretaries of the Military Department, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Undersecretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense, - -  
General Counsel of the Department of Defense Agencies,  
Commanders of the Combatant Commands, Directors of Defense  
Agencies, and Chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board,  
Secretary of Defense William Cohen spelled out emphatically his  
intent on the subject: "Integration of the Reserve and Active  
Components." After acknowledging the increased reliance on  
Reserve Components since the end of the Cold War he highlighted  
almost thirty years of attempts to integrate Reserve Components  
into a total force beginning in 1970 when:

Secretary Melvin Laird set this Department on the  
right course when he directed concurrent consideration  
of the Total Force, Active and Reserve, in planning,  
programming, manning, equipping and employing Guard  
and reserve forces. He recognized that the lower  
peacetime sustaining costs of reserve force units  
could result in a larger Total Force for a given  
budget.

He further noted successive Secretaries of Defense buy-in  
to the Total Force concept (Secretary James Schlesinger, 1973,  
Secretary Casper Weinberger, 1982, and Secretary William Perry,  
1995).

Secretary Cohen finished his memorandum tasking all to

Create an environment that eliminates all barriers -  
structural and cultural for effective integration with  
our Total Force. By integration I mean the condition  
of readiness and trust needed for the leadership at  
all levels to have well - justified confidence that  
Reserve Component units are trained and equipped to  
serve as an effective part of the joint as a combined  
force within whatever time lines are set for the unit

in peace and war.- Only when the following four basic - principles are achieved throughout the Department will Total Force integration be a reality:

1. Clearly understood responsibility for and ownership of the Total Force by the senior leaders throughout the Total Force.
2. Clear and mutual understanding on the mission for each unit - Active, Guard, and Reserve.
3. Commitment to provide the resources needed to accomplish assigned missions.
4. Leadership by senior commanders - Active, Guard, and Reserves - to ensure the readiness of the Total Force.

We cannot achieve this as separate components.<sup>16</sup>

In "A statement on the Posture of the United State Army Fiscal Year 1998" General Dennis Reimer and Secretary of the Army, the Honorable Togo D. West, Jr. stated:

Today's Army is truly America's Army - a Total Force of Active Army, Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and civilian employees. The drawdown, reduced force structure, and increased operational commitments both at home and abroad have reinforced the need for a high level of integration between the Active and Reserve Components.<sup>17</sup>

### CONTROVERSY

With all this spoken support, surely we should be closer than ever in achieving the integration mandated, a seamless force. Hardly! What is most surprising is for years few people mentioned or gave comments to interviewers who would publish their statements any indication that a rift existed. It seems

only natural that in our American culture, the inbred competitiveness mandates conflict.

Besides cultural barriers between the Active and Reserve Components, there are "barriers" between the different services, different states, different branches within the Army, AGR/Technician and traditional Reserve Component soldiers.

The rhetoric that has graced so many newspapers, magazines, and television stories over the past six months to a year hasn't done much to help eliminate any of the friction between the Active Army and the Reserve Components.

It was upsetting for Reserve Component soldiers to read an article by Rick Maze in the Army Times titled: "Reserve Tour Rejected for Cadets" followed by "Officers: Diverting Academy Grads From Active Duty is Waste of Money, Talent:" Also in large print was:

If the assignments were voluntary, there might not be enough graduates who wanted to go, service official warned. And if the Reserve assignments were not voluntary, that might have a negative impact on cadets and midshipmen.

The article also stated: "Taxpayers also might not think reserve service is sufficient payback for an academy education." Obviously, neither author Rick Maze, nor the "officials" realize there are Active Duty Guard and Reserve Officers within the Reserve Component. The article did little to alleviate any friction, instead, it added fuel to an already flaming issue.<sup>18</sup>

An October 20, 1997 Washington Post Article by Bradley - -  
Graham titled: "National Guard, Regular Army in a Tug of War"  
said:

Officials on both sides say the outcome will determine the survival of a military doctrine that calls for a cohesive "Total Force" comprising both Active Duty and Reserve troops, at the heart of national defense.<sup>19</sup>

In a June 5, 1997 Washington Times article by Philip Gold, he said, "the fracas was inevitable." It was inevitable because the National Guard senior leadership complained that the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) had not given them an opportunity to state their position. Secretary Cohen told them to go through their chain of command. They did, through their other chain of command. They went to their governors, who started writing to the President, with a copy furnished to the Pentagon which got Secretary Cohen's attention. Mr. Gold's article follows with a sad decry that whatever the National Guard and Army agree to in their "off-site," won't last long. The Army and National Guard have been at it for centuries." He cites four reasons why "the Guard has a greater relevance today than during the Cold War:"

1. The U.S. simply cannot afford to maintain a large standing army. Nor can the U.S. afford to maintain large portions of the present force at high readiness. Reserves are far cheaper.
2. The Guard and service Reserves provide a de facto "people veto" on major foreign involvements.
3. The Guard is a classic "dual use" system, available for foreign and domestic tasks. The Guard, not the

standing Army, should drive the nuclear/biological/-chemical weapons disaster relief mission.

4. The standing army is an institution in profound disarray, trashed by scandal and, in many ways, looking for work that will generate hard cash and renewed respect.

Philip Gold ended his article with these points:

The political and cultural justifications for the Guard don't address one particular question: Can they be ready to do the job? Obviously, the answer depends on what the job is and what you mean by ready. Still one thing is clear. There is no inherent reason the Guard cannot perform adequately across the range of its missions. High priority units can be filled with people willing to accept high levels of contractual obligation, including extended Active duty and early call-up. In short, the Guard's proficiency is limited only by resource and creativity - and by a standing Army that, for reasons of its own, prefers not to acknowledge it ... that standing army isn't evil, it's simply fighting for its institutional life and soul<sup>20</sup>

Katherine McIntire Peters wrote in an article called "Defense On Guard" that because fifty-four percent of the army is in the Reserves, "We cannot go to war without them. We cannot even do Bosnia without them." She further states that the "cost of maintaining such a large reserve component is not justified given the services budget constraints and tremendous difficulty in maintaining combat skills in a modern, part-time force." Modernizing Guard and Reserve equipment along with personnel costs add up to about \$9 billion a year, a significant chunk of the Army's \$60 billion annual budget."<sup>21</sup>

Ms. Peters has quoted one former Army Staff officer as - - saying, "The bottom line is we're spending scarce resources for units that few people outside the Guard ever expect will see a battlefield." That same former staff officer also states "the divisions have no role in the Defense Department's current war plans, but they provide the guard with cherished command slots for senior officers." Ms. Peters notes that the "schism between the Army and the Guard has forged a new relationship between the Guard and the Air Force." An Air Force officer familiar with the issue said "there is a coordinated effort between the Air Force and Guard to force cuts in the Army... If the Army loses troops, that's more money for the Guard and the Air Force."<sup>22</sup>

The Honorable Deborah R. Lee, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), made a presentation to the National Defense Panel titled "The RC (Reserve Components) Evolution and the Payoff for the Total Force." She began with the following slide:

**Secretary Cohen's Goal for the Total Force, in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century:**

Our goal, as we move into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, must be a seamless total force that provides the National Command Authority the flexibility and interoperability necessary for the full range of military operation.<sup>23</sup>

If cost is the issue, the Honorable Deborah R. Lee's slide on the economic benefit of storing capabilities in the Reserve

Components should be that comparably equipped Reserve Component - ground units cost the Army twenty to thirty percent of what Active Component units cost to keep in our force structure. The army must truly investigate and implement a broader integration of the Active Component and Reserve Component combat troops.

We have seen the upheaval caused by changing unit flags. When the 112<sup>th</sup> Engineer battalion changed under the Engineer Restructuring Initiative (E.R.I), the turbulence was violent. Nearly every soldier in the Headquarters Company became Non-MOSQ (Military Occupational Specialty Qualified) and had to go back for additional training, even though many of their job responsibilities didn't change. Added to this turbulence was the lack of funding which resulted in a policy that all soldiers that attend schools required for promotion did so in lieu of attending their two week Annual Training. Imagine what changing a flag would do when an ambulance company converted to an engineer firefighting detachment, or an artillery battery converted to a transportation company with almost no carry over MOS slots.

Colonel Ronald G. Young, President of the Ohio National Guard Association made a key point in his "From the President" message of "The Guard Post" (October, 1997): Speaking about Secretary Cohen's memo and the goal of a "seamless force" he said: "This goal cannot be achieved, of course, as separate

components protecting their own turf." Colonel Young believes - that Congress should mandate an appropriate balance of forces be maintained in the National Guard to fulfill its state mission of emergency response. "Since Desert Storm, the National Guard and the nation have battled many more devastating floods, hurricanes, snowstorms, and wildfires than foreign foes."<sup>24</sup>

John C.E. Tillson, who formerly served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, wrote in the summer 1997 issue of Joint Forces Quarterly:

Despite success, problems remain. Relations between the Active and Reserve Components are at times dysfunctional, largely because of different cultures. There is an uncertainty about the factors needed to meet the demands of national strategy. The first step is to change the culture of the Active and Reserve Components to enhance the effectiveness of the Total Force concept. That means influencing the beliefs, values, and wishes of each component with respect to the organization, capabilities, and expertise of the other. Cooperation and trust are central to the total force. But lack of trust between the Active and Reserve Components is an impediment. The resulting competition is dysfunctional. The next step is to expand total force policy by greater use of Reserve Forces. Employment of them in recent years has been influenced by our experience during the Cold War and in Vietnam. The Cold War threatened national existence and required a large ready force. High readiness led not only to the bias in favor of Active forces but also to providing the Reserve Components with the resources to maintain unprecedented readiness. The decision not to call up the Reserves during Vietnam created an impression that they would only be used in a conflict against the Warsaw Pact. The end of the Cold War lifted the threat to national existence, yet the demands on our forces have steadily increased...the decision to mobilize Reserves can

enhance links between the Armed Forces and the American People.<sup>25</sup>

#### INHERENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD

Quite possibly one of the most important initiatives coming into place today is the Active Component / National Guard Integrated Division. One of the problems in the mobilization of combat troops for the Gulf War was the high number of commanders who were relieved prior to the validation as fit for combat. With direct interaction between the Active and Reserve units within the Integrated Division there should be no reason why the Active Component cannot coach and mentor the National Guard leaders to eliminate this problem prior to mobilization. This is a giant step towards achieving a seamless force. By no means are we suggesting all Divisions should be totally integrated. Quick reaction forces cannot wait for reserves to train during a post mobilization period.

In his 8 September 97 speech before the NGAUS convention, General Dennis Reimer said:

I believe very strongly that the limiting factors of future operations may be human endurance. We found out that computers do not get tired - people get tired. This argues for greater integration between and among the components. We must have multiple crews and systems if we really want to get the fullest capabilities out of the force. It is possible that we

have a mirror image of a force or an organization in two components. If you want a capability that allows you to take the fight to the enemy 24 hours a day, you bring in the one component and place it on top of the other for full 24-hour capabilities. This is something we have to develop, because the potential is there and it is very, very great.<sup>26</sup>

Lieutenant General John Woodmansee (US Army Retired), expanded on General Reimer's theme. Woodmansee states that the National Guard units should mirror the Active Component units because the National Guard is our "insurance policy" for any large warfighting contingency. He believes that the National Guard should have overlapping reinforcing functions in all areas (to include hi-tech modernized forces, as well as specialized forces such as artillery, engineers, port clearance companies, etc...).

Lieutenant General Woodmansee warned that National Guard forces cannot place inordinate requirements for resources that would limit those resources available for Active Component units. This may be at the heart of the "rift." He believes there is a role for some combat Reserve Component units to be modernized and for units, company size and below to affiliate themselves with Active Component units. He suggests the National Guard should pick out some function and integrate with the Active Component counterpart or parent unit. An example of this integrated function would be the Comanche Aircraft. The National Guard would receive three Comanche Aircrafts and assign

eighteen crews to those aircraft with an Active Component - - affiliated parent unit who would train together and ensure readiness levels were appropriate as well as continuity between the soldiers. This Active Component / Reserve Component affiliation would give the deployed integrated unit a full 24 hour capability.<sup>27</sup>

Another opportunity for the Army National Guard is to continue and expand the Army National Guard State Partnership program with Partnership for Peace countries. In General Ralston's speech to NGAUS he said: "...twenty-nine states are directly involved with nations around the world to shape our international environment..." with excellent performance.<sup>28</sup>

General Ralston also points out:

the Army National Guard is making significant contributions to smaller scale contingencies. We've had Army National Guard ground units in Kuwait, Turkey, and Haiti; Company C, 3rd Battalion, 116th Infantry of the Virginia Army National Guard is scheduled to leave for Bosnia in October (97)...the first Army National Guard unit in the country to be sent abroad as Infantry since Vietnam.<sup>29</sup>

#### MARINE CORPS COMBAT MODEL FOR ACTIVE COMPONENT / RESERVE

#### COMPONENT INTEGRATION

- In her January 22, 1998 article "Defense On Guard", - -  
Katherine McIntire Peters states "Integration is critical." She  
quotes the Honorable Deborah Lee:

it is critical that the Army work out its differences  
with the Guard. Reservists' participation in military  
operations across the services has increased fivefold  
since 1989. The increase has been necessary to  
relieve tremendous pressure on active-duty troops,  
especially in the Army, who on average are deployed  
190 days a year.<sup>30</sup>

Ms. Peters goes on to make a very interesting statement:

While the size of the Army's Reserve Components is  
uniquely high among the services, the Army might take  
some lessons from the Marines, who have successfully  
integrated reservists into combat operations, and the  
Air Force, which relies heavily on Guard and Reserve  
units for day-to-day operations as well as  
contingencies. In the Marines, where the ground  
combat mission compares most closely with the Army's,  
reserve combat units are integrated into the active  
Marine Corps at much lower levels than the National  
Guard's brigades and divisions.<sup>31</sup>

Ms. Peters quotes Marine Brigadier General Wallace Gregson,  
the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policy, and  
Operations for the Marines.

We feel that we can maintain well-trained and ready  
battalions and squadrons, but that given the dynamics  
of reserve training time, trying to provide anything  
above battalions, and squadrons, like regiments or  
divisions, or air wings that are purely reserve, would  
be expecting a bit much. . . .

. . . The Marines are also helped by the fact that on  
average, active-duty Marines comprise fifteen percent  
of Marine Reserve units. The high percentage of  
active involvement in the reserve units ensures that  
training is consistent with Marine standards and  
readiness requirements are met.

Ms. Peters says that:

While the size of the Army National Guard precludes such intensive involvement on the part of the active Army, the Army will soon try a new approach to better integrate with the Guard. Six of the Guard's fifteen elite combat units, its enhanced readiness brigades (which are not part of the eight controversial divisions), will be turned into two Integrated Divisions under an active duty headquarters. She quotes Ms. Lee: The idea is that you will have a couple hundred Active duty soldiers who are full-time, 365 days a year, whose full-time job will be to plan, work with, train and have ownership of the responsibility for these Guard divisions.<sup>32</sup>

In an article attacking what author Jeffrey A. Jacobs calls "The Conspiracy Theory," Jacobs calls comparing Army National Guard combat units to Marine Corps combat units "is like comparing apples to oranges", not "apples to apples" as MG Alexander's May 1997 (NGAUS) President's Message called the comparison. Jacobs agrees that Marine Corps Reserve maneuver combat units performed well in Desert Storm, and adds that a Marine reserve tank battalion recently outshot its active Marine counterpart at Ft. Knox, Kentucky. The Marines have created a reserve structure with a key factor that the Army National Guard has consistently resisted: "pervasive Active Component control." The Marine Corps has Active Component Marines numbering 4,500 in a Reserve Component that numbers less than ten times that number - 42,000. There are at least one Active Component officer and several Active Component Marine non-

commissioned officers in every Marine Corps Reserve company.- -  
These "inspector-instructors" have made Marine Reserve units  
culturally indistinct from Active Component units."

Jacobs states:

In contrast, there are barely 200 Active Component Army soldiers assigned to support the Army National Guard, whose end-strength is 367,000. And although the Army should increase the level of Active Component support to the Reserve Components, the Guard has made it clear that it is reluctant to accept even the advice, much less the instructions of Active Component soldiers.<sup>33</sup>

In Major General Alexander's "An Apples-to-Apples Comparison" message, he stated that Army must be accountable for the relationship it has with the Army Guard combat units. He is also extremely pleased with the new Integrated Divisions:

We (the Army and the Army National Guard) are headed to integrated units across the board...combat divisions - integrated in the future with Active Component leadership will be a reality (to be utilized in a second Major Theater War when needed).<sup>34</sup>

As the Adjutant General of the State of Ohio and president of NGAUS, his statements seem hardly those one would expect from a leader reluctant to accept advice or instruction from the Active Component. When asked how the rift could be eliminated, Major General Alexander replied:

Over and over again Active Component commanders in areas where Army National units or troops are utilized (Peacekeeping missions, humanitarian missions, support missions, disaster missions, etc.) 'discover' the great asset the Total Force has in the Army National Guard. When we stop being discovered, we will be

integrated into the Army!...We must become a known asset of the Army.<sup>35</sup>

### MENDING "THE RIFT"

General Dennis Reimer, Chief of Staff of the Army, stated in the October issue of Armed Forces Quarterly:

(Assessing the rift between the Active Component and the Army National Guard) My thinking on this issue has been consistent over time. First of all, I am a big proponent of the Total Army. If you look at the way we've constructed the Army, it is very dependent upon all three components. The United States Army consists of the Active Component, the U.S. Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard. 54 percent of our force is in the reserve components: about 63 percent of the field artillery is in the Army National Guard; 72 percent of our combat service support units are in the reserve component; and 98 percent of our psychological operations and civil affairs units are in the Reserve Components. We must have a heavy investment in those forces-the readiness of the Total Force is extremely important to us. We must make the commitment to keep the Total Force ready. We cannot go to war as an Active Component alone. I am trying very hard to make sure that everybody understands that I am the Chief of Staff of the Total Army, and I want to bring all components together and leverage the great strength and capabilities that each component has. What I promised them (at the National Guard convention) is that I would make every effort to do what is right for the Total Army and consequently, do what's right for the nation.<sup>36</sup>

In General Reimer's speech at the 1997 NGAUS convention, he listed four principles or Total Army "tenets" he plans on following over the next two years. They are:

1. The protection of the vital interests of our Nation is our number one priority-the survival of the nation state.

2. I believe the link to the American people is critical. I know that the Reserve Component provides the strongest link. Senator Stevens (Alaska) said it very well: "for most Americans, the Army Reserve and Army National Guard are the presence of the Total Army in their communities. That link between our citizenry and our military was of paramount importance to our founding fathers. Their vision has weathered the test of time, and circumstances today make that line no less vital."
3. The soldiers that we have in the Total Army must be adequately trained before they are put in harm's way.
4. It is very important that the total force be a seamless force.<sup>37</sup>

With Secretary Cohen's emphasis on endorsing the Total Force, the National Guard has experienced a rapid change of pace in relations with the active military community. These new relationships, forged in the heated debates of 1997, are already reaping positive results for the Guard as we enter the new year.<sup>38</sup>

In December 1997, a major milestone in National Guard/Army relations was achieved with the announcement of a U.S. Army plan to constitute two Active Component / Army National Guard Integrated Divisions. Secretary Cohen lauded the initiative for helping create a 'seamless Total Army for the 21st Century' and increasing the Army's readiness and capability to respond in an ever-changing defense environment. Secretary Cohen reasserted his praise of the initiative that the creation of a seamless Total Force is one of his highest priorities. Forming

Integrated Active Component / Army National Guard Divisions has - long been sought by the National Guard as a method for the Active Army to take ownership for Reserve Component combat readiness and assuring the resources necessary to maintain that readiness.

Deputy Defense Secretary Hamre announced that the identification (ID) card for all members of the U.S. military, Active, Guard, and Reserve, will now be the same color-green. The change is being made in the spirit of Secretary Cohen's pledge to eliminate all structural and cultural barriers of effective integration of the Reserve Components into the Total Force. He is optimistic about the new relationships and commitments by the Active, Guard, and Reserve forces to work together in the best interest of the nation.<sup>39</sup>

In a reply to a USA Today editorial titled "Expand Guard's Duties? It Can't do its Main Job," General William W. Couch, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army said:

The Army National Guard continues to be an indispensable component of the total Army, responsive to federal authorities in times of national need and to our governors and civil authorities in meeting domestic needs. This dual capability, with roots in nearly every community in the nation and a rich tradition of service, always will remain an indispensable part of our Army. The Army National Guard played a key role in the Cold War, and during the past few years we've witnessed an increased use of Army National Guard forces in military operations overseas and at home. Whether supporting the Partnership for Peace initiatives in Europe, serving

in the peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and Macedonia, or providing security for the Atlanta Olympics, the National Guard is actively and professionally serving the nation. While their contributions rarely capture national headlines, the men and women of the Army National Guard have never failed to meet their commitments to keeping our nation strong and secure, regardless of the personal sacrifices required.<sup>40</sup>

Lieutenant General Edward D. Baca, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, in a letter following that of General Couch on the same subject said:

The Guard can defend America, and it has done so superbly for more than 360 years. It has answered every call. Defending America is today and always has been the constitutional mission of the Guard. The Guard responds daily to the call of the governors and citizens of the nation. And it is there quickly and effectively - normally within an hour, sometimes less. The Guard has never failed the 'real-world' test.<sup>41</sup>

Lieutenant General Baca readily points out that most of the problems that the Guard has are directly related to the lack of resources available to train the Guard.<sup>42</sup>

#### SIMULATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE FOR READINESS INTEGRATION

If the integration of the ARNG into the Total Army is to take place, the use of simulation is vital to the success of the Guard's readiness. While the Guard should recognize that it may not be possible to financially and simultaneously outfit the AC and the RC, Dr. Walter LaBerge, former undersecretary of the Army, says that providing simulators to the Guard is the next

best thing to their lack of modernized equipment. He says that - sufficient training on simulators will "significantly shorten the time necessary to ready the RC for combat on the battlefield for the future."<sup>43</sup> The use of simulation training becomes the lifeline for the Guard. While the AC has time on its side the RC usually has time as one of its foes. Simulators provide a hefty return on investment. Squeezed between the cost of conducting live maneuver training and the even steeper cost of firing expensive missiles and other weapons, simulators become the most viable option for maintaining combat efficiency. For example, the cost of flying an Apache helicopter for an hour and a half and firing its basic load of Hellfire missiles, rockets and chain gun rounds, costs about \$335,000. Compare this to the cost of utilizing a simulator for \$143.<sup>44</sup>

The Army Science Board 1991 Study on Army Simulation Strategy unequivocally conveyed the reality: "Increased automation of our forces and materiel, including its acquisition and operational utilization, provides the highest payoff potential as a force multiplier to offset the ongoing force reduction."<sup>45</sup> Traditionally, the ARNG has been the last one to receive all the latest modernization equipment. But that is starting to change. Through most of our year long fellowship many general officers and senior civilians have been saying that

the RC will be getting the current technology, at times being simultaneous with the AC.

One example of this is the procurement of the Aviation Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (AVCATT). It is on the STRICOM master schedule for FY 01. A similar program already exists for the ARNG called the Aviation Reconfigurable Manned Simulator (ARMS). The ARNG is planning on configuring six of these simulators within six regions of the United States and they plan on making the ARMS mobile.<sup>46</sup> This will greatly enhance the helicopter pilot's flying requirements and competency level.

The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) Simulations in Training for Advanced Readiness (SIMITAR) project is an application that will change the way an ARNG maneuver combat brigade trains through the use of advanced technologies, simulation devices and innovative training strategies. Through SIMITAR, the ARNG's goal is to increase unit training readiness by 200 - 300 percent.<sup>47</sup>

Annual Training 1995 became the first indicator of SIMITAR's potential. The 116<sup>th</sup> Armored Brigade of the Idaho ARNG qualified five out of seven crews on Tank Table VIII on the second day of annual training. Success at the platoon gunnery level was close behind. None of the platoons failed during their tactical evaluation phase. The AC master gunners

attributed their success directly to their revised training procedures.<sup>48</sup>

The increased use of simulations - based training will continue to be a priority for the ARNG. Training Aids, Devices, Simulations and Simulators (TADSS) at each echelon will provide commanders with the appropriate mix of live and virtual training to maintain unit readiness. Substantial efficiencies will be recognized by decreasing the resources required for traditional field training as well as enable units to preserve the quality of the environment. The use of simulation training sites will increase the amount of time that the guard soldiers spend on training and reduce the time and expense associated with travel to and from field training areas.

## CONCLUSION

Surely, the senior leaders of all three components must realize that the political bickering and present rift between the Active Component and the Reserve Component (especially the Army National Guard) serves no one and does little to further the cause of our nation, the Total Army, or any of the three components. Hopefully, the Total Army and the leadership of its three components will be smart enough to work together.

As we approach the 21<sup>st</sup> century, there is less consensus on our role in the world and on the use of American military power, including the use of our citizen soldiers, than at any time since before World War II. Paul Nitze, one of the deans of the national security establishment, stated that "There is less consensus today among Americans about the direction of U.S. foreign policy and security policy than there was at the end of World War II." 49

None of the three components, the Active Army, the Army National Guard, nor the Army Reserves, has the total monopoly of "good soldiers", "good leaders", or "good units". Likewise, none has the monopoly of "poor soldiers", "poor leaders", or "poor units". We have personally seen good and poor in each and realize if we coordinate our efforts at the top, our real credentials, our soldiers, as well as the nation will benefit immensely.

Hopefully, Congress and the Department of Defense realize that if you want the support of the people you have to utilize the Reserves, but that alone should not be the reason to call up reservists. It should be because of the services and skills they bring to the mission.

"If we do not work together...", as Dr. Keith Charles stated so prophetically to our U.S. Army War College fellowship class at the University of Texas, "...if we don't remain coordinated in

our efforts, (Active Component, Reserve Component and Department-  
of Army Civilians) we will consume each other."<sup>50</sup> Let's not  
"consume" each other.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Active Component should study all ramifications of dramatically increasing the presence of both junior officers and senior non-commissioned officers into the mainstream of the Reserve Component units, especially combat units. The level at which all components feel comfortable to integrate Reserve Component units into early deploying combat units must be found and attained.
2. The Active Component must take responsibility for resourcing, training, and maintaining readiness (which includes training and developing the leaders as well as the soldiers) of the Reserve Component early deploying or Force Support Package (FSP) units.
3. To keep consistent with the Department of the Defense's "first to fight" policy, it is imperative that the modernization of early deploying Active Component and Reserve Component units are compatible and interoperable. Therefore, the Reserve Component

elements of the Contingency Force Support Packages must be modernized simultaneously with the Active Component.

4. The Active Component needs to ensure the money being spent on the AC/RC Integrated Divisions remains a top priority. The Integrated Division design places three ARNG Enhanced Separate Brigades under a multi-component headquarters commanded by an Active Component Major General. Units will be fully organized personnel wise but have only enough equipment to train during peacetime. In a future of dwindling resources, this initiative could well be the answer for maintaining desired readiness.
5. The Active Component should study initiatives that further integrate selected units of the Reserve Component into daily operations and deployments. The Army National Guard has already rotated a unit made up of 29<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division soldiers from Maryland and Virginia with great success through the Multinational Force Observers (MFO) mission in the Sinai. In addition to great training opportunities for the Reserve Component, Active Component OPTEMPO is dramatically decreased which allows the Active Component to focus on Warfighter exercises, Joint

· Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotations and National-  
Training Center (NTC) rotations.

6. The ARNG should aggressively pursue the leveraging of technology to maintain the ability to rapidly integrate with the Active Component. This can be accomplished through the use of more integrated command post exercises, preferably in association with an Active Component Division "Warfighter." The stressful environment these simulations create are essential training tools needed by commanders and their staffs to develop the synchronization skills necessary on today's battlefields. Focus must be aimed at issues associated with the integration of AC/RC units.

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